Professor Plucknett, With best wishes and trepidation. A small but real comfort is that I cannot guess whether, if you denounce me for this, it will be as a heretic or a copycat. 12 The opening couple of pages lay out the primarily destructive thesis, that trespass was not inevitably concerned with direct forcible injuries, but, as he had earlier put it put it, just meant wrong. 13 Gone in a moment was the thencurrent thinking that the writ of trespass was derived in some sense from the appeal of felony or the assize of novel disseisin. 14 Instead we were left with a jurisdictional question, what was it that enabled certain wrongs to be actionable in the royal courts? What had appeared for centuries to be a fundamental division between trespass and trespass on the case was reduced to a rather less fundamental question of how a civil action for wrongdoing should be pleaded. Medieval tort law was being radically reshaped.
We must be careful not to exaggerate Milsom's originality. A year earlier of a new form of action, but of the propriety of using special writs instead of the general writ alleging force of arms and a breach of the King's peace.
Problems remained, since some fairly radical change did seem to have occurred in the late 1360s, but the redefinition of the question meant that it was possible to approach the answer in a very different way from before; and the detailed consideration of cases from the plea rolls as well as the reports, the year books, meant that the answer was far more nuanced.
The legal history of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries gives greater scope for the use of reported discussions of the law as found in the I'm not very happy about this, but hope that some of the spadework may turn out to be useful.
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He continues the article with marginally more ambition:
The wider aim was selfish: the writer is preparing a study, in more detail than those existing, of the personal actions down to 1600; and the difficulty, as always, is in asking the questions.
It is all very Milsomian. The question was certainly right, and the hardest thing, as always, was to ask the question in the first place. But asking the right question does not guarantee getting the right answer, and I think the scholarly consensus now is that Milsom's answer was indeed wrong. 26 We cannot be sure, and there is a real dearth of direct evidence. Practically all that we can go by is the wording of the assize itself, and that is decidedly ambivalent. There is slender evidence that disseisin was not necessarily something that could only be done by a feudal lord. A writ of Queen Matilda has her indignantly complaining that her own tenants had been disseised, 27 and we can be fairly sure that they had not been disseised by her. It looks as if the word was wide enough to encompass the ejection of someone who was properly seised, not simply the improper breach of the relationship. Other features of the writ are similarly equivocal.
Milsom's interpretation is seductive, but by no means conclusive. in the later version we are not really dealing with dispossessions at all, but with the failure to observe due process. The former, limited, thesis could well be right, but it is the latter one which is really powerful and which I find hard to accept. Its implication is genuinely radical, that the assize of novel disseisin brought about a massive legal transformation, from a feudal world in which the primary focus of the law was the personal relationship between lord and tenant, and land was simply the object of that relationship, to a world of property law, where the feudal tenant had a property right in land and the lord no more than a residual economic right. In other words, novel disseisin brought about a law of real property which did not exist in the purely feudal world.
As Milsom himself would have put it, either the fit is perfect or it is wrong. I don't think the fit is perfect, however seductive it is. That said, however, if we remove the heresy and take the assize of novel disseisin out of the picture, the fundamental thesis of the translation of feudal relationships into property rights has a lot of substance. claim, and unless we are misled by appearances the major transformation from personal relationship to property right does indeed look to have occurred.
It is easy to see the attraction of attributing such a major shift in thinking to the operation of novel disseisin. Something, surely, must have happened to break down the feudal framework within which the relationship between lord and man was the dominant element and to replace it with a framework best described in terms of property rights. promises, that we can only guess. It could easily have been both. Did trusts originally involve trusting? And so on. Words do not always mean what we think they mean, and we need always to be awake to the possibility that they are being used in a technical sense which would have been recognised at the time, or that a legal concept has developed without an accepted name and only later has the particular technical legal name stuck. We have tort cases based on negligentia from the fourteenth century, but I doubt there was a clear sense that it means the failure to take the care that would have been taken by a reasonable man until the eighteenth century at the earliest.
Nevertheless, so long as we are careful, the Milsomian insight that words originally had their normal general meanings is very valuable. I suspect that it is something that we all tend to assume in our own work today.
Another insight which is of general importance is that legal development consists in the repeated abuse of basic legal ideas. 35 Abuse, not merely use. So when we say a trespassory form of action being used for breaches of contracts in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries we need not assume that it was genuinely believed that these cases were seen in what we would call genuinely avoid the problem of lack of evidence of something. Did it not happen, or was it so routine that it was not worth recording, or was a point so obvious that parties to a dispute always compromised? All we can look for as legal historians are tiny traces in the sand of things that might have been abundantly obvious to contemporaries -or, indeed, might just as easily have been unnoticed by them too.
All this is pure Milsom, and it is eye-opening for all those of us who try to get to grips with the realities of legal history. All of it is summed up in his final book, A Natural History of the Common Law, and it and all his publications underpinning it are works of real scholarly genius. Even if every point he had made about substantive law were dismissed as pure heresy, and of course it will not be, his influence on English legal history will have been profound.
So it is with real diffidence that I end by venturing a couple of qualms about
Milsom's jurisprudence.
The first perhaps proves his point that one's approach to legal history may depend on one's intellectual upbringing or background. I am, at least in part, a Roman lawyer, so it is perhaps inevitable that I will see Roman law obtruding into English law more than a non-Roman lawyer would. But I do think it cannot be ignored. We must always be careful to be suspicious of too- Milsom, I am sure, recognised all of this, which is why he said that in legal history all major conclusions must be provisional, all analyses personal. It was why he put so much weight on the role of lawyers trying to win the instant case, with never a thought that they might be changing the law. It was why he stressed his intellectual formation as a lawyer, though one who was also a natural scientist at heart who had reluctantly forsaken his test tubes. we may often do, his way of looking at a subject cannot fail to influence our own. His willingness to approach a topic by leaving aside orthodoxies and looking at it afresh should be an inspiration to us, though his willingness to develop his arguments through exhausting analysis of plea rolls, year books, charters and other legal literature can be dispiriting for those who want their legal history easy. No-one since Maitland had done so much to put our subject on a new footing. We are privileged to be his followers.
41 "Reason in the Development of the Common Law", 510.
